Zionists terrorist who attacks British

Zionist terrorists against UK:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles...
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/wo...
http://www.jpost.com/Features/In-Thes...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zionist_...
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/wor...
http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmv...










Ben Gurion:
http://thinkexist.com/quotation/if-i-...
Originally quoted by Nahum Goldmann, in The Jewish Paradox : A Personal Memoir of Historic Encounters that Shaped the Drama of Modern Jewry (1978)

IDF Human Shields:
http://www.haaretz.com/news/idf-troop...
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,73...
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/un-report...

UN shelters bombed:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/i...
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014...

Myth of human shields:
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/mehdi...

Israel encouraged Hamas:
http://original.antiwar.com/justin/20...
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/S...
http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Po...

Hamas didn't kidnap:
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/...

Egypt destroyed tunnels, no casualties reported:
http://www.timesofisrael.com/egypt-de...

Israel bombed power plant:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014...

Segregation/Racism in Israel:
http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/school...
http://www.vice.com/read/israeli-raci...

IDF tortured children:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/0...
https://news.vice.com/article/israel-...

Zionist terrorists:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles...
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/history/wo...
http://www.jpost.com/Features/In-Thes...
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zionist_...
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/wor...
http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmv...

British imperialized Palestine:
http://www.regentsprep.org/Regents/gl...

Land granted to Jews:
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_centu...
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world...

ISIS—the New Israel, The same tactics to build ethnically pure state

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is our Frankenstein. The United States after a decade of war in Iraq pieced together its body parts. We jolted it into life. We bathed it in blood and trauma. And we gave it its intelligence. Its dark and vicious heart of vengeance and war is our heart. It kills as we kill. It tortures as we torture. It carries out conquest as we carry out conquest. It is building a state driven by hatred for American occupation, a product of the death, horror and destruction we visited on the Middle East. ISIS now controls an area the size of Texas. It is erasing the borders established by French and British colonial powers through the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement. There is little we can do to stop it.

ISIS, ironically, is perhaps the only example of successful nation-building in the contemporary Middle East, despite the billions of dollars we have squandered in Iraq and Afghanistan. Its quest for an ethnically pure Sunni state mirrors the quest for a Jewish state eventually carved out of Palestine in 1948. Its tactics are much like those of the Jewish guerrillas who used violence, terrorism, foreign fighters, clandestine arms shipments and foreign money, along with horrific ethnic cleansing and the massacre of hundreds of Arab civilians, to create Israel. Antagonistic ISIS and Israeli states, infected by religious fundamentalism, would be irreconcilable neighbors. This is a recipe for apocalyptic warfare. We provided the ingredients.

ISIS is seeking to establish, as the Zionists did in Palestine, a utopian, religious state. It holds up the ancient Caliphate—which united Muslims throughout the Middle East in the seventh century and whose time is considered the golden age of Islam—as an ideal, much as Jews held up the biblical kingdoms chronicled in the Hebrew Bible.

Terror, as was true for the Jewish fighters in Palestine in the late 1940s, is an effective tool to intimidate opponents and accelerate ethnic cleansing. The fear of ISIS is its most potent weapon. Iraqi army troops, although better armed than ISIS fighters and outnumbering them, drop their U.S.-supplied weapons and flee before ISIS. Shiites abandon whole villages to ISIS. And all the U.S. advisers sent to put some spine in the Iraqi government forces have so far been unable to significantly stem the advance.



The demolish of the Moroccan Quarter

Israeli attempts at re-configuring Arab Jerusalem have been varied over the past half-century. Appropriating the built form in Palestinian owned areas of the city has most often meant seizing Arab structures, homes, and neighborhoods, emptying them of their Arab inhabitants, and substituting new histories, new communities, and new meanings in place of old. Entire neighborhoods and thousands of Arab homes were taken over by the nascent Jewish state in 1948. Occasionally, however, the Israeli state has sought to demolish and to physically erase particular areas of Palestinian habitation that obstruct Israeli visions for exclusive rule in what mainstream Zionism regards as Israel‘s "eternal" and "unified" capital. 


The Harat al-Magharibah (the Moroccan Quarter), first constructed over 700 years ago in the age of the Ayyubids and Mamluks, was on the eve of the June 1967 War home to approximately 650 people and 100 families. The neighborhood was demolished by the Israeli state in the days immediately after it conquered East Jerusalem. This former space represents a site where practices of ethnic cleansing and wholesale dispossession have been combined with Israeli discourses of "the sacred" as well as others which promote exclusivist, transhistorical notions of Jewish entitlement to the city.
What is today referred to in the dominant, Zionist cartography as the "Western Wall Plaza" is of only recent construction. The Wall itself, once the western enclosure of the Herodian Temple (the Second Temple), has been a place of Jewish worship for several centuries. However, the currently comprised space before the wall—exceptional by the standards of the densely populated Old City for its lack of built form—is of only recent invention. The Character of the Neighborhood before 1948 The structures that comprised this neighborhood over the course of seven centuries were familial, religious, and social and were built mainly of stone and brick. Clustered densely together, these modest one and two story buildings enveloped a network of narrow alleyways that snaked through this largely poor neighborhood. Its population became increasingly diverse in the centuries after the quarter‘s inception. Historically, most families resident in this quarter traced a genealogy back to the Maghrib. Pilgrimage or oppression in former lands brought many to Jerusalem. Over the course of several centuries, Jewish, Christian, and Muslim Arabs from Palestine and elsewhere also took up residence in this quarter.
A number of historians of Jerusalem describe the Moroccan Quarter as dating from the time of the Ayyubids. Mujir al-Din relates that ‘Afdal al-Din (son of Salahdin) "endowed as waqf the entire quarter of the Maghribis in favor of the Maghribi community, without distinction of origin" and that the "donation took place at the time when the prince ruled over Damascus [AD 1186-1196], to which Jerusalem was joined."[1] He simultaneously allowed for the building of the Hayya al-Sharif neighborhood, contiguous to the Moroccan Quarter in what today Israel refers to as the "Jewish Quarter."[2] As a waqf endowment, the area was specified to serve as a haven for new arrivals from Morocco, and from the thirteenth century until the last days of the Jordanian regime in 1967, immigrants arrived to, made their home in, and visited this neighborhood from the western reaches of the Islamic world.
This corner of the Old City, roughly 10,000 square meters in size, became the site of a number of historically and culturally significant structures erected during the age of the Ayyubids and Mamlukes. These included the Jami‘ al-Magharibeh near the Bab Maghribeh and the Zawiyya Fahriyya.[3] ‘Afdal also endowed and built al-Madrasa al-‘Afdaliyya in this quarter during the later part of the twelth century for the use of the Maliki fuqaha (jurists).[4] The quarter, as constituted in the thirteenth century, came within meters of the Western Wall. The Herodian-era Wall, known to Jews since the age of the Second Temple as possessing "the presence of God," was used as a regular site of prayer after Sultan Sulayman (1520-66) ordered that a space between the Moroccan Quarter and the Wall be cleared for such purposes. Before the era of Sulayman, however, the evidence of regular prayer at the site is somewhat ambiguous.[5] 1948-1967: Divided Landscapes
The War of 1948 led to the division of the city, with the Jordanians holding the Old City and Israel the city‘s west side. Intense fighting took place in the vicinity of this quarter between Zionist forces sent to wrest this area from the Jordanian forces. The former were eventually defeated in the summer of 1948. They and the 1,500 Jewish civilians living in this part of the Old City were expelled (the non-combatants were sent across the frontier that divided the city between Israeli and Jordanian held sectors, while the Jewish soldiers were held and then released a few months later). The flight of these 1,500 Jews coincided with the forced removal of 700,000 Arabs from areas of historic Palestine conquered by Israel in 1948, including 70,000 from Jerusalem neighborhoods and the city‘s surrounding villages.[6]
Recalling the years of the "divided city," residents of the Moroccan Quarter remember a simmering conflict between residents and Palestinian landlords over ownership rights for certain familial properties in the quarter. Other significant moments included the 1965 evictions of Palestinian squatters in Jewish properties contiguous to the Moroccan Quarter by the Jordanian government and the subsequent transfer of these families to the Shu‘fat Refugee Camp, four kilometers north of the Old City.[7] Speculation as to the Jordanian‘s intentions in this matter circulate to this day in Palestinian Jerusalem. 1967: The "Liberation" of East Jerusalem
The Israeli conquest of East Jerusalem came suddenly during the first week of June 1967 and brought the entire city under sole Israeli control. With the advent of Israeli occupation in East Jerusalem came an entire set of bureaucratic initiatives meant to re-configure this highly contested urban space. These schemes and the assumptions underlying them represented a continuation of policies of erasure, removal, and segregation begun in 1948.
One former resident of the Moroccan Quarter, a man in his thirties in June 1967, relates that in the days immediately following the Israeli entry into the Old City, the entire neighborhood was put under strict curfew. Palestinians were confined to their homes while their new "masters"—Israeli planners, politicians, and generals—met to determine the fate of their quarter and the Old City as a whole.[8] Very soon after the war, the Israeli state took a decision (without the consultation of the Palestinian residents) that the area before the Wall was "needed" for the use of the Jewish state and that the neighborhood "obstructed" the designs of the architects of occupation. The residents of the quarter would have to go.
The process of removing this unwanted population was initiated swiftly and with uncompromising severity. On the evening of 10 June 1967 the several hundred residents of the Moroccan Quarter were given two hours notice to vacate their homes. Those who refused the orders were forcefully evicted from their places of residence, as bulldozers and floodlights were mobilized to raze the area. So suddenly came this dictate that one woman from the quarter who did not hear the calls to vacate was buried alive beneath the rubble that evening. Her body was found the next morning under the ruins of her home.
Nearly all of the quarter‘s 135 homes were flattened by the evening of 11 June, with the "cleaning up process" proceeding for a few days thereafter. Certain structures on the neighborhood‘s periphery, however, were initially retained, most notably a mosque near the Bab Maghribeh, and the Zawiyya Fakhriyya. Both, however, were eventually razed in 1969. Palestinian historian Albert Algazerian believes that these religious sites were initially left standing as a gesture to the Moroccan King Hassan II, a monarch with whom Israel wished to cultivate a relationship and with whom many Moroccans of this community maintained close ties.[9] Roughly one-half of the neighborhood‘s residents at the time of its demolition traced a lineage back to the Maghrib. Many of these returned to Morocco via Amman with the assistance of King Hassan II after the destruction of the quarter. Other families from the neighborhood found refuge in the Shu‘fat Refugee Camp and elsewhere in Jerusalem.[10]
Muhammed Abdel-Haq, the current mukhtar of the Moroccan Quarter community, is the son of a man who journeyed to Palestine from Rabat, Morocco in the 1920s. He describes the trauma his and other displaced families have experienced, both in the wake of their forced removal in 1967 and since. "In the days after the demolition," he relates, "my wife and child would return to the site of our home and wait for the Israeli bulldozers to clear the rubble somewhat so that we might retrieve clothes and other belongings which we did not have time to take with us." They repeated this ritual everyday for weeks, never recovering any of their lost property. Another former resident remembers how the Israeli military authorities would regularly cordon off the vicinity of the destroyed quarter for "security purposes" in the afternoon hours so that those who still resided in the area could often not return to their homes at night if they did not return before the closure.
Ironically, it was not until several months after their forced removal and the paving over of their neighborhood that the Israeli Municipality and the Ministry of Treasury actually presented the community with eviction and expropriation orders. On 14 April 1968 came the order by the Israeli Ministry of the Treasury to expropriate 116 dunums of land in and near the "Jewish Quarter" for "public use."[11] These documents were accompanied by an Israeli offer of "compensation": a mere 200 dinars to each displaced family.[12] Abdel-Haq believes that roughly half of the residents took the compensation. Others, including him, refused it in principle: to accept it, he explains, would be to legitimize the erasure of their community.Ethnic Cleansing as Historical Process
Though the destruction of the quarter has been written about elsewhere, few works have detailed the personal consequences of displacement and the everyday qualities of loss for the former inhabitants of this largely forgotten quarter. For many of these Palestinian residents, the processes of colonial appropriation have been the dominant features of their lives. Abdel-Haq and his family have been displaced as the result of Israeli aggression on three occasions since the birth of the state. In 1948, Zionist armies raided his family‘s village of Beit Shanna, a small Muslim hamlet near Latrun, emptied it of its inhabitants, and destroyed the homes of the village. His family then sought refuge in the Moroccan Quarter, where his father kept a small property. There they resided for the next nineteen years until the evictions of June 1967. In the post-war period, when many of the neighborhood‘s Moroccan families returned to Morocco, he and his family stayed on in Jerusalem in another structure not far from the site of their demolished homes. In 1977, however, as part of Israel‘s efforts to make the newly comprised "Jewish Quarter" "clean of Palestinians," they were ejected a third time. The mukhtar and his family have now taken up another dwelling in the Muslim Quarter. Israeli Rationales for the Destruction of the Quarter: The "Presence of the Holy"
The motivations of the Israeli state for obliterating this quarter were the same as those invoked for altering the rest of occupied Jerusalem since 1948. Underlying these schemes was and is the notion that the rights of the Jewish People in and to their "eternal" capital supercede those of the Palestinians. The logic that propelled then Mayor Teddy Kollek and others to erase the Moroccan Quarter community mirrors the vision of Zionist planners in other locales and in different times before and since. Meron Benvenisti, then deputy mayor of Israeli Jerusalem under Kollek, relates the dominant rationale and the "practical" considerations which propelled this simultaneous construction and destruction of the Old City‘s landscape:

The former space in front of the Wall could not have accommodated the 400,000 people who swarmed to the site; the maximum number able to pray there during the Mandate were 12,000 per day. Practical considerations were the determining factor in the demolition of the buildings of the Arab Quarter.[13]
The desire to accommodate an expected influx of Jewish visitors to the Wall served as the justification for the displacement of another people and the silencing of their histories. Similar decisions were taken by the new occupying power in East Jerusalem after 1967—both in a newly defined "Jewish Quarter" (see below) as well as in other regions of a radically reconfigured Jerusalem.[14] Spatially this has meant the intensification of segregationist practices and the policing of highly fortressed boundaries between Israelis and Palestinians. Consolidating Israeli rule in the city has also entailed over determining the "demographic balance" by housing tens of thousands of Israeli Jews in illegal settlements in East Jerusalem while deeply constraining Palestinian growth and development in the city. Re-configuring the Moroccan Quarter
The newly comprised area before the wall was transformed within weeks of the Moroccan Quarter‘s destruction. The hundreds of thousands of Jewish visitors that the Israeli Government predicted would wish to visit the Kotel did arrive within days of the city‘s "liberation." They approached the Wall, walking literally over the ruins of the former Arab neighborhood, which few no doubt knew had been razed only days earlier. Through a swift and resolute reconstruction, the area became—and remains—the "Western Wall Plaza" in the dominant Zionist lexicon.
One segment directly before the Western Wall, consisting of roughly fifty meters in length and another fifty in width, was designated as an orthodox synagogue. This cordoned off area has been deemed "sacred space" and is partitioned between a men‘s and women‘s section. As the Israeli state reconfigured this area, the claim for the existence of the "presence of God" was now expanded. It was now made not only about the Wall itself, but also about territory several dozen meters before it—over precisely the area where the demolished Moroccan Quarter once stood. Leaving aside the question of whether the area does in fact contain the "presence of God," its designation as "eternal" and as an "immutable" part of the Jewish nation is belied by the very recently invented quality of this space. The arbitrariness of establishing this site as "sacred" and "eternal" is underscored by Benvenisti‘s assertion that there was and is no way of assessing what segment of this area belongs to the Jewish state by right: "How far," he asks, "did the holiness of the Western Wall extend?"[15]
Beyond the synagogue exists the greater part of the space of the razed neighborhood. This segment of the plaza is utilized not so much for secular purposes, as opposed to religious, but rather for rituals where religion, nationalism, and militarism converge and merge. This is the site of swearing-in ceremonies for Israeli soldiers as well as the final stop of the annual "Jerusalem March": an Israeli mass spectacle organized to demonstrate the Jewish state‘s sole claim to its "unified capital." Israel‘s Jewish Quarter: Eternal or Recently Invented?
It is a scarcely known fact that most of what today is defined by Israel as the "Jewish Quarter" is in fact land appropriated from Palestinians. Only 20 percent of the territory of the current quarter is in fact Jewish property. This reality is less difficult to hide today, since in the years after 1967 some 6,000 Arab Christians and Muslims have been evicted from this area of the Old City. Palestinians are precluded from living in the newly defined "Jewish Quarter" for the simple reason that they are not Jewish. This explicit restriction was contrived by the private company put in charge of "developing" and "reconstructing" the new "Jewish Quarter" after 1967.
This discriminatory stipulation remains "good law" by a 1978 decision of the Israeli Supreme Court. The case in question is known as the Burqan case and involved the contest between Muhammed Burqan and the Israeli state over the former‘s family home.[16] The Israeli Supreme Court, in its ruling, said something quite interesting. They recognized that the house did in fact belong to Burqan, but they refused to allow Burqan the right to return to his home because the area had "special historical significance" to Jews. This "significance" was said to supercede all other claims by non-Jews—including that of the actual owner of the home. Burqan‘s property was therefore expropriated by the Israeli state. His family—like dozens of others—was banished from the area. Conclusion
The story of the Moroccan Quarter and the violent processes that led to its erasure are not simply anecdotal but emblematic as well. The destruction of this community is consistent with the practices of violence and visions of exclusivity that have defined and engendered Israeli policy in occupied Jerusalem since 1948. The vast re-configuration of the city to suit segregationist designs (a process which has not yet come to a halt) has suppressed histories not of exclusive and monolithic quarters, but of fluidity, mixture, and inter-communal interaction (if not always complete cooperation) across a vibrant and changing urban space. One need not be nostalgic about Jerusalem‘s past to acknowledge this heritage and the many histories which comprise it.
Tom Abowd is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Anthropology at Columbia University. His dissertation focuses on the politics of space, racism, and the production of history in contemporary Jerusalem.


Toll of Israeli Prisoner of War Massacres Grows

By Katherine M. Metres

"If I were to be put on trial for what I did, then it would be necessary to put on trial at least one-half the Israeli army which, in similar circumstances, did what I did."—Israeli Brig. Gen. Aryeh Biro, who admitted to killing hundreds of unresisting Egyptians.
In July 1995, the long, hidden story began to leak. Publication in the Israeli press of a study undertaken for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) briefly noted that 35 Egyptian "soldiers"—actually civilian Public Works employees, it was later admitted—were murdered during the 1956 Suez War, ostensibly because there was insufficient manpower to guard them (Davar, 7/21/95). After this little-noticed article was published, the military censor could no longer prevent the publication of historian Ronal Fisher's research on Israeli massacres of 273 Egyptians who, according to international law, should have been prisoners of war (Ma'ariv, 8/8/95).*
Former soldiers' recollections of the massacres they committed gained momentum, and soon a host of war crimes previously known only to the participants came to light in the mainstream Israeli press. Israelis admitted that in the 1967 Six-Day War, the IDF executed Palestinian POWs who were fighting in the Egyptian army, a thousand unresisting Egyptians, and dozens of unarmed Palestinian refugees.
The 1956 massacres occurred in the context of the lsraeli invasion of the Egyptian Sinai, which was planned in collusion with Britain and France in order to overthrow Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and return the Suez Canal to European control. The war began when Israeli Battalion 890 parachuted onto the eastern side of Sinai's Mitla Pass. The battalion was commanded by Raphael (Raful) Eitan, who later helped carry out Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon and who played a role in the massacres of Palestinian and Lebanese civilian residents of the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in West Beirut.
The Israeli paratroopers rounded up 49 Egyptian and Sudanese civil engineers who were camped near the invaders. Later, when Eitan received orders to move on, the Israelis tied the workers' hands and executed them. Aryeh Biro, the commander who ordered the deed and subsequently was promoted to brigadier general, says his unit killed them because there was no manpower for guarding prisoners and he feared they could inform the Egyptian troops of the Israeli unit's whereabouts. Biro's action constitutes a clear violation of the international prohibition on the execution of innocent civilians.
Fisher's eyewitnesses continue: On the fourth day of the 1956 invasion, a truck approached Eitan's Israeli battalion at Ras Sudar in Sinai. One of the men on the truck fired "a few aimless bullets," but the truck stopped short when an IDF anti-tank grenade hit it, killing the driver. According to Shaul Ziv, who fired that grenade, the exchange should have ended then, since the men in the truck, Palestinian and Egyptian irregulars, were stunned and unmoving. Yet Biro ordered his men to shoot until the last of the 56 men in the truck was dead.

The Real Carnage Begins

And then the real carnage began. On the sixth day of the campaign, Eitan's battalion set out for Sharm al-Sheikh. Before the Israeli soldiers reached their destination, they killed at least another 168 Egyptians. (According to Biro himself, that number is low. He says his men killed "most of" a company of about 400. Prof. Israel Shahak, an Israeli writer and translator of Hebrew-language reports, says at least 2,000 Egyptians were killed.) The IDF says the "unit confronted an Egyptian division, a small part of which began a battle with our troops and was eliminated in the course of exchanges of fire. Most of the Egyptians were then taken prisoner and held until transferred to Israeli territory."
Independent Israeli historians disagree with the army's sanitized version of events. Uri Milstein, a right-winger, and Meir Pa'il, a former general associated with the far left, agree on this point. Milstein says that the Egyptians were surrounded by advancing Israeli units and "in the course of their attempt to escape, the Egyptians lost all of their operational capabilities and fell into groups, thirsty, hungry and exhausted, and then into the hands of Raful and his soldiers. The men of Battalion 890 understood that nothing would be done to them if they eliminated a few dozen or a few hundred POWs, as long as they won the war and returned home as heroes...Therefore, nearly every Egyptian who confronted him and his soldiers was eliminated in the course of the advance to the south."
Pa'il concurs: "In actual fact, what happened was that Battalion 890 met a disintegrated and defeated unit of the Egyptian army in Sharm al-Sheikh, a unit which could not fight and which was only seeking a way to be taken prisoner. If, nevertheless, there were several Egyptian soldiers who fired a bullet or two, no one really thought that they intended to fight. Raful saw that he did not have enough men to put in charge of the gathering of Egyptian soldiers who wanted to surrender and gave an order to kill all of them...For him, a soldier who takes a transistor radio as booty is a criminal. But a soldier who kills an Arab, hands up or hands down, is blessed."
In spite of the facts of history—ranging from the 1948 massacre of Palestinian civilians in Deir Yassin to the 1994 murders of Muslim men and boys at prayer in Hebron—many Israelis continue to see themselves as morally superior to their neighbors. The news of the massacres pierced this persistent myth once again. Predictably, the Israeli public reacted with shock. However, while some were shocked at the crimes ("How could we?"), others were shocked only at the revelation of the crimes ("Why did these former soldiers and historians reveal this damaging information now?").
Ben Dror Yemini, a Labor party activist, is an example of the latter. He asserted that the uproar over the massacres amounted to the "rewriting of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion." His reference to an infamous "plan" by Jews to rule the world, thought to be a fabrication of Czarist Russian secret police, was an attempt to paint those who have made the massacres public as self-destructive accessories to anti-Semitism. He concluded smugly, "Not everyone among our fighters is the best person in the world, but compared to what happened in other places, we the Jews are nevertheless almost angels" (Ma'ariv , 8/20/95).
In reality, Israeli forces' not infrequent failure to distinguish between armed enemy soldiers who have not surrendered, soldiers who have laid down their arms, and noncombatants has been far from angelic. For example, the day before the murders at Mitla, Israeli border guards had killed 49 Palestinian farmers, citizens of Israel. Their only crime was attempting to return to their homes in the village of Kufr Qassem which, unknown to them, had been placed under curfew while they were at work in their fields. Likewise, in 1967, after Israel occupied the West Bank, many families who had fled across the Jordan River during the fighting were shot by the IDF while they were trying to return to their West Bank homes (News From Within, 9/95).
Just as reports of the 1956 massacres implicate Rafael Eitan, a prominent right-wing figure in contemporary Israeli politics, reports now coming out of Israel regarding the 1967 war pose a serious threat to the current Labor government, because they implicate "Fouad" Ben Eliezer, the minister of housing. Aryeh Yitzhaki, a mainstream historian, states that "in the Six Day War the IDF killed approximately 1,000 Egyptian soldiers who had ceased functioning as a fighting force." Apparently, Eliezer's Shaked unit was responsible for one-third of those murders, which occurred during an operation called "Gazelle Hunt" because the IDF slaughtered the soldiers as they retreated (Ha'aretz, 8/17/95).
Dr. Yitzhaki reports that Palestinian volunteers in the Egyptian army were executed Nazi-style in E1-Arish, another area of the Sinai, in 1967. Gabby Biron, a right-wing journalist who witnessed the murder of about 10 POWs before being forced to leave, confirmed Yitzhaki's report. Biron says that Israeli intelligence officers put POWs one by one through a short interrogation. If the IDF determined by the prisoner's accent that he was Palestinian, he was taken behind the building, forced to dig his own grave, and shot. According to Holocaust survivors, the incident bears a striking similarity to Nazi tactics.

Were these crimes of passion or part of a planned campaign?

Were these crimes of passion or part of a planned campaign? Until a comprehensive investigation is undertaken, we can only speculate. As regards the "Gazelle Hunt" murders, Israeli leftist activist Eli Aminov says, "It is clear to any military expert that the order given to the Shaked patrol was part of a more extensive body of orders. This is evident from the large number of Egyptian soldiers killed in battle during June 1967 compared to the number of prisoners taken. The Egyptian army was crushed and fell apart after a few battles and most of it retreated in disorganization" (News From Within, 9/95).
Unsurprisingly, the Egyptian public is outraged by these reports. (Palestinians may be equally outraged, but for them the new reports merely elaborate on known atrocities that, however, Western reporters had refused to credit until Israelis confirmed the reports in print.) After Cairo's semi-official newspaper Al-Ahram reported that Egyptian officials found two mass graves near El-Arish in September said to contain the remains of POWs and unarmed civilians executed by the IDF in 1967, opposition papers called on the Mubarak regime to withdraw its ambassador from Tel Aviv in protest. The Muslim Brotherhood has linked its denunciation of the massacres with its opposition to the peace process.
From the center and left of the political spectrum, more than 200 prominent citizens formed a committee to seek justice. Egyptian judges and international law professors met at Cairo University to assert that Egypt has the right to demand extradition and to try those allegedly responsible. Several private lawyers have filed lawsuits against the Israeli government on behalf of the victims' families. The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights sent evidence to U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and called for a full U.N. inquiry.

Prior Knowledge?

Some believe that the Egyptian government knew about the incidents before the recent reports were published in the Hebrew press. Aminov says that Nasser kept the information under wraps because he did not want the public to know the extent of the Egyptian defeat. Likewise, later governments, criticized at home and in Arab circles for making peace with the enemy, preferred not to make an issue of past atrocities. A physician who witnessed the massacres in 1956, Ahmed Shawki el-Fangari, wrote about them in his 1960 book Israel As I Knew It, but Egyptian authorities banned it (Geneive Abdo, The Dallas Morning News, 9/16/95).
However, the coverup theory is not altogether compelling. First of all, el-Fangari's book may have been censored for a variety of reasons. More importantly, it would have been difficult, after the fact, for the Egyptian government to determine the exact circumstances in which it lost soldiers. Finally, between Nasser's death in 1970 and the late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's 1977 peace initiative, Egypt had every reason to reveal any knowledge of Israeli wrongdoing in order to mobilize the international community against Israel's occupation of the Sinai.
In any case, after a cautious initial reaction, the Egyptian government pledged that there would be no business as usual until Israel investigates the incidents and puts the guilty behind bars. The Ministry of Justice is compiling evidence to be used if Egypt takes legal action against Israel.
The Israeli government, embarrassed by the fact that some of the allegations came from the actual Israeli participants, belatedly apologized and offered compensation to the victims. In December, it also announced that it would undertake an investigation. However, according to the Israeli attorney general, his country will not prosecute because of its 20-year statute of limitations on crimes.
This excuse ignores the fact that war crimes are covered by international law, which does not impose a time limit on prosecution. No one knows this better than the Israelis, who continue to prosecute persons believed to be Nazi war criminals.
The legal instrument that covers these acts is the (Third) Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, to which Israel is a party. According to Stephen Marks, an international law professor at Columbia University and former U.N. official, the key provision is Article 4's definition of prisoners of war as "members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces that havefallen into the power of the enemy." Thus the acts described here appear to be grave breaches of international humanitarian law.
Israel says, in a phrase that rang through the incremental peace process engineered by the late Yitzhak Rabin, that the issue will be resolved not according to international law but through inter-state negotiation. "We don't think that putting history as the number one agenda item will benefit the relationship," Gideon Mark, spokesman for the Israeli Consulate in New York told theWashington Report on Middle East Affairs, in a Nov. 17 phone interview.
Making the issue its sole priority does not appear to be the intention of the Egyptian government, not least because its own human rights record contains serious violations incurred in its efforts to repress its violent and nonviolent Islamist opposition. Rather, its efforts seem in large part to have been prompted by public rage.
Furthermore, Egyptian Ambassador to the United Nations Nabil Elaraby noted in a Nov. 18 interview that Egypt does not condemn the Israeli government for the killings but merely wants the individual perpetrators to be punished. Asked if he is concerned by allegations that Egyptians have committed war crimes against Israelis, Elaraby says the Egyptian government is prepared to investigate and prosecute any such criminal.
Meanwhile, Israelis like Yemini have argued that the revelations are a right-wing conspiracy to sabotage the peace process, particularly the sensitive relationship with Egypt. Yet the information has come from all parts of the Israeli political spectrum. Indeed, many Israelis say that they knew about the incidents all along.
In fact, the only real controversy is whether the incidents should have been discussed so openly in the press. The late Prime Minister Rabin and a Belz Hassidic journalist named A. Avramson both called the revelations a form of "suicide." Others worried, "If Hezbollah knew that we murder prisoners of war—why should they not murder our men who fall into their hands?" (Michael Ben-Zohar, Ma'ariv, 8/17/95)
There is little doubt that the climate of impunity that accompanied the 1956 massacres made the 1967 atrocities possible. To usher in an era of Middle Eastern peace based on justice, the states of the region must come clean, establish a climate of responsibility by prosecuting past crimes, and thereby put the future on a more humane footing. Despite the wishful thinking of ideologues, there are no angels among Middle Eastern states. The only angels are the innocent dead.
*Except for the Davar article, all translations can be found in Dr. Israel Shahak's "From the Hebrew Press," Woodbridge, VA: Middle East Data Center, October 1995.
Katherine M. Metres is a graduate student in international affairs at Columbia University, where she is concentrating on human rights and the Middle East.

source: http://www.wrmea.org/2007-may-june/israels-hush-up-machine-in-action-denying-story-israel-executed-egyptian-prisoners.html 

Top Ten Myths about the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Myth #1 – Jews and Arabs have always been in conflict in the region.

Although Arabs were a majority in Palestine prior to the creation of the state of Israel, there had always been a Jewish population, as well. For the most part, Jewish Palestinians got along with their Arab neighbors. This began to change with the onset of the Zionist movement, because the Zionists rejected the right of the Palestinians to self-determination and wanted Palestine for their own, to create a “Jewish State” in a region where Arabs were the majority and owned most of the land.
For instance, after a series of riots in Jaffa in 1921 resulting in the deaths of 47 Jews and 48 Arabs, the occupying British held a commission of inquiry, which reported their finding that “there is no inherent anti-Semitism in the country, racial or religious.” Rather, Arab attacks on Jewish communities were the result of Arab fears about the stated goal of the Zionists to take over the land.
After major violence again erupted in 1929, the British Shaw Commission report noted that “In less than 10 years three serious attacks have been made by Arabs on Jews. For 80 years before the first of these attacks there is no recorded instance of any similar incidents.” Representatives from all sides of the emerging conflict testified to the commission that prior to the First World War, “the Jews and Arabs lived side by side if not in amity, at least with tolerance, a quality which today is almost unknown in Palestine.” The problem was that “The Arab people of Palestine are today united in their demand for representative government”, but were being denied that right by the Zionists and their British benefactors.
The British Hope-Simpson report of 1930 similarly noted that Jewish residents of non-Zionist communities in Palestine enjoyed friendship with their Arab neighbors. “It is quite a common sight to see an Arab sitting in the verandah of a Jewish house”, the report noted. “The position is entirely different in the Zionist colonies.”

Myth #2 – The United Nations created Israel.

The U.N. became involved when the British sought to wash its hands of the volatile situation its policies had helped to create, and to extricate itself from Palestine. To that end, they requested that the U.N. take up the matter.
As a result, a U.N. Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP) was created to examine the issue and offer its recommendation on how to resolve the conflict. UNSCOP contained no representatives from any Arab country and in the end issued a report that explicitly rejected the right of the Palestinians to self-determination. Rejecting the democratic solution to the conflict, UNSCOP instead proposed that Palestine be partitioned into two states: one Arab and one Jewish.
The U.N. General Assembly endorsed UNSCOP’s in its Resolution 181. It is often claimed that this resolution “partitioned” Palestine, or that it provided Zionist leaders with a legal mandate for their subsequent declaration of the existence of the state of Israel, or some other similar variation on the theme. All such claims are absolutely false.
Resolution 181 merely endorsed UNSCOP’s report and conclusions as a recommendation. Needless to say, for Palestine to have been officially partitioned, this recommendation would have had to have been accepted by both Jews and Arabs, which it was not.
Moreover, General Assembly resolutions are not considered legally binding (only Security Council resolutions are). And, furthermore, the U.N. would have had no authority to take land from one people and hand it over to another, and any such resolution seeking to so partition Palestine would have been null and void, anyway.

Myth #3 – The Arabs missed an opportunity to have their own state in 1947.

The U.N. recommendation to partition Palestine was rejected by the Arabs. Many commentators today point to this rejection as constituting a missed “opportunity” for the Arabs to have had their own state. But characterizing this as an “opportunity” for the Arabs is patently ridiculous. The Partition plan was in no way, shape, or form an “opportunity” for the Arabs.
First of all, as already noted, Arabs were a large majority in Palestine at the time, with Jews making up about a third of the population by then, due to massive immigration of Jews from Europe (in 1922, by contrast, a British census showed that Jews represented only about 11 percent of the population).
Additionally, land ownership statistics from 1945 showed that Arabs owned more land than Jews in every single district of Palestine, including Jaffa, where Arabs owned 47 percent of the land while Jews owned 39 percent – and Jaffa boasted the highest percentage of Jewish-owned land of any district. In other districts, Arabs owned an even larger portion of the land. At the extreme other end, for instance, in Ramallah, Arabs owned 99 percent of the land. In the whole of Palestine, Arabs owned 85 percent of the land, while Jews owned less than 7 percent, which remained the case up until the time of Israel’s creation.
Yet, despite these facts, the U.N. partition recommendation had called for more than half of the land of Palestine to be given to the Zionists for their “Jewish State”. The truth is that no Arab could be reasonably expected to accept such an unjust proposal. For political commentators today to describe the Arabs’ refusal to accept a recommendation that their land be taken away from them, premised upon the explicit rejection of their right to self-determination, as a “missed opportunity” represents either an astounding ignorance of the roots of the conflict or an unwillingness to look honestly at its history.
It should also be noted that the partition plan was also rejected by many Zionist leaders. Among those who supported the idea, which included David Ben-Gurion, their reasoning was that this would be a pragmatic step towards their goal of acquiring the whole of Palestine for a “Jewish State” – something which could be finally accomplished later through force of arms.
When the idea of partition was first raised years earlier, for instance, Ben-Gurion had written that “after we become a strong force, as the result of the creation of a state, we shall abolish partition and expand to the whole of Palestine”. Partition should be accepted, he argued, “to prepare the ground for our expansion into the whole of Palestine”. The Jewish State would then “have to preserve order”, if the Arabs would not acquiesce, “by machine guns, if necessary.”

Myth #4 – Israel has a “right to exist”.

The fact that this term is used exclusively with regard to Israel is instructive as to its legitimacy, as is the fact that the demand is placed upon Palestinians to recognize Israel’s “right to exist”, while no similar demand is placed upon Israelis to recognize the “right to exist” of a Palestinian state.
Nations don’t have rights, people do. The proper framework for discussion is within that of the right of all peoples to self-determination. Seen in this, the proper framework, it is an elementary observation that it is not the Arabs which have denied Jews that right, but the Jews which have denied that right to the Arabs. The terminology of Israel’s “right to exist” is constantly employed to obfuscate that fact.
As already noted, Israel was not created by the U.N., but came into being on May 14, 1948, when the Zionist leadership unilaterally, and with no legal authority, declared Israel’s existence, with no specification as to the extent of the new state’s borders. In a moment, the Zionists had declared that Arabs no longer the owners of their land – it now belonged to the Jews. In an instant, the Zionists had declared that the majority Arabs of Palestine were now second-class citizens in the new “Jewish State”.
The Arabs, needless to say, did not passively accept this development, and neighboring Arab countries declared war on the Zionist regime in order to prevent such a grave injustice against the majority inhabitants of Palestine.
It must be emphasized that the Zionists had no right to most of the land they declared as part of Israel, while the Arabs did. This war, therefore, was not, as is commonly asserted in mainstream commentary, an act of aggression by the Arab states against Israel. Rather, the Arabs were acting in defense of their rights, to prevent the Zionists from illegally and unjustly taking over Arab lands and otherwise disenfranchising the Arab population. The act of aggression was the Zionist leadership’s unilateral declaration of the existence of Israel, and the Zionists’ use of violence to enforce their aims both prior to and subsequent to that declaration.
In the course of the war that ensued, Israel implemented a policy of ethnic cleansing. 700,000 Arab Palestinians were either forced from their homes or fled out of fear of further massacres, such as had occurred in the village of Deir Yassin shortly before the Zionist declaration. These Palestinians have never been allowed to return to their homes and land, despite it being internationally recognized and encoded in international law that such refugees have an inherent “right of return”.
Palestinians will never agree to the demand made of them by Israel and its main benefactor, the U.S., to recognize Israel’s “right to exist”. To do so is effectively to claim that Israel had a “right” to take Arab land, while Arabs had no right to their own land. It is effectively to claim that Israel had a “right” to ethnically cleanse Palestine, while Arabs had no right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness in their own homes, on their own land.
The constant use of the term “right to exist” in discourse today serves one specific purpose: It is designed to obfuscate the reality that it is the Jews that have denied the Arab right to self-determination, and not vice versa, and to otherwise attempt to legitimize Israeli crimes against the Palestinians, both historical and contemporary.

Myth #5 – The Arab nations threatened Israel with annihilation in 1967 and 1973

The fact of the matter is that it was Israel that fired the first shot of the “Six Day War”. Early on the morning of June 5, Israel launched fighters in a surprise attack on Egypt (then the United Arab Republic), and successfully decimated the Egyptian air force while most of its planes were still on the ground.
It is virtually obligatory for this attack to be described by commentators today as “preemptive”. But to have been “preemptive”, by definition, there must have been an imminent threat of Egyptian aggression against Israel. Yet there was none.
It is commonly claimed that President Nasser’s bellicose rhetoric, blockade of the Straits of Tiran, movement of troops into the Sinai Peninsula, and expulsion of U.N. peacekeeping forces from its side of the border collectively constituted such an imminent threat.
Yet, both U.S. and Israeli intelligence assessed at the time that the likelihood Nasser would actually attack was low. The CIA assessed that Israel had overwhelming superiority in force of arms, and would, in the event of a war, defeat the Arab forces within two weeks; within a week if Israel attacked first, which is what actually occurred.
It must be kept in mind that Egypt had been the victim of aggression by the British, French, and Israelis in the 1956 “Suez Crisis”, following Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal. In that war, the three aggressor nations conspired to wage war upon Egypt, which resulted in an Israeli occupation of the Sinai Peninsula. Under U.S. pressure, Israel withdrew from the Sinai in 1957, but Egypt had not forgotten the Israeli aggression.
Moreover, Egypt had formed a loose alliance with Syria and Jordan, with each pledging to come to the aid of the others in the event of a war with Israel. Jordan had criticized Nasser for not living up to that pledge after the Israeli attack on West Bank village of Samu the year before, and his rhetoric was a transparent attempt to regain face in the Arab world.
That Nasser’s positioning was defensive, rather than projecting an intention to wage an offensive against Israel, was well recognized among prominent Israelis. As Avraham Sela of the Shalem Center has observed, “The Egyptian buildup in Sinai lacked a clear offensive plan, and Nasser’s defensive instructions explicitly assumed an Israeli first strike.”
Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin acknowledged that “In June 1967, we again had a choice. The Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him.”
Yitzhak Rabin, who would also later become Prime Minister of Israel, admitted in 1968 that “I do not think Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent to the Sinai would not have been sufficient to launch an offensive war. He knew it and we knew it.”
Israelis have also acknowledged that their own rhetoric at the time about the “threat” of “annihilation” from the Arab states was pure propaganda.
General Chaim Herzog, commanding general and first military governor of the occupied West Bank following the war, admitted that “There was no danger of annihilation. Israeli headquarters never believed in this danger.”
General Ezer Weizman similarly said, “There was never a danger of extermination. This hypothesis had never been considered in any serious meeting.”
Chief of Staff Haim Bar-Lev acknowledged, “We were not threatened with genocide on the eve of the Six-Day War, and we had never thought of such possibility.”
Israeli Minister of Housing Mordechai Bentov has also acknowledged that “The entire story of the danger of extermination was invented in every detail, and exaggerated a posteriori to justify the annexation of new Arab territory.”
In 1973, in what Israelis call the “Yom Kippur War”, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise offensive to retake the Sinai and the Golan Heights, respectively. This joint action is popularly described in contemporaneous accounts as an “invasion” of or act of “aggression” against Israel.
Yet, as already noted, following the June ’67 war, the U.N. Security Council passed resolution 242 calling upon Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories. Israel, needless to say, refused to do so and has remained in perpetual violation of international law ever since.
During the 1973 war, Egypt and Syria thus “invaded” their own territory, then under illegaloccupation by Israel. The corollary of the description of this war as an act of Arab aggression implicitly assumes that the Sinai Peninsula, Golan Heights, West Bank, and Gaza Strip were Israeli territory. This is, needless to say, a grossly false assumption that demonstrates the absolutely prejudicial and biased nature of mainstream commentary when it comes to the Israeli-Arab conflict.
This false narrative fits in with the larger overall narrative, equally fallacious, of Israeli as the “victim” of Arab intransigence and aggression. This narrative, largely unquestioned in the West, flips reality on its head.

Myth #6 – U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 called only for a partial Israeli withdrawal.

Resolution 242 was passed in the wake of the June ’67 war and called for the “Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.” While the above argument enjoys widespread popularity, it has no merit whatsoever.
The central thesis of this argument is that the absence of the word “the” before “occupied territories” in that clause means not “all of the occupied territories” were intended. Essentially, this argument rests upon the ridiculous logic that because the word “the” was omitted from the clause, we may therefore understand this to mean that “some of the occupied territories” was the intended meaning.
Grammatically, the absence of the word “the” has no effect on the meaning of this clause, which refers to “territories”, plural. A simple litmus test question is: Is it territory that was occupied by Israel in the ’67 war? If yes, then, under international law and Resolution 242, Israel is required to withdraw from that territory. Such territories include the Syrian Golan Heights, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.
The French version of the resolution, equally authentic as the English, contains the definite article, and a majority of the members of the Security Council made clear during deliberations that their understanding of the resolution was that it would require Israel to fully withdraw from all occupied territories.
Additionally, it is impossible to reconcile with the principle of international law cited in the preamble to the resolution, of “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war”. To say that the U.N. intended that Israel could retain some of the territory it occupied during the war would fly in the face of this cited principle.
One could go on to address various other logical fallacies associated with this frivolous argument, but as it is absurd on its face, it would be superfluous to do so.

Myth #7 – Israeli military action against its neighbors is only taken to defend itself against terrorism.

The facts tell another story. Take, for instance, the devastating 1982 Israeli war on Lebanon. As political analyst Noam Chomsky extensively documents in his epic analysis “The Fateful Triangle”, this military offensive was carried out with barely even the thinnest veil of a pretext.
While one may read contemporary accounts insisting this war was fought in response to a constant shelling of northern Israeli by the PLO, then based in Lebanon, the truth is that, despite continuous Israeli provocations, the PLO had with only a few exceptions abided by a cease-fire that had been in place. Moreover, in each of those instances, it was Israel that had first violated the cease-fire.
Among the Israeli provocations, throughout early 1982, it attacked and sank Lebanese fishing boats and otherwise committed hundreds of violations of Lebanese territorial waters. It committed thousands of violations of Lebanese airspace, yet never did manage to provoke the PLO response it sought to serve as the casus belli for the planned invasion of Lebanon.
On May 9, Israel bombed Lebanon, an act that was finally met with a PLO response when it launched rocket and artillery fire into Israel.
Then a terrorist group headed by Abu Nidal attempted to assassinate Israeli Ambassador Shlomo Argov in London. Although the PLO itself had been at war with Abu Nidal, who had been condemned to death by a Fatah military tribunal in 1973, and despite the fact that Abu Nidal was not based in Lebanon, Israel cited this event as a pretext to bomb the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, killing 200 Palestinians. The PLO responded by shelling settlements in northern Israel. Yet Israel did not manage to provoke the kind of larger-scale response it was looking to use as a casus belli for its planned invasion.
As Israeli scholar Yehoshua Porath has suggested, Israel’s decision to invade Lebanon, far from being a response to PLO attacks, rather “flowed from the very fact that the cease-fire had been observed”. Writing in the Israeli daily Haaretz, Porath assessed that “The government’s hope is that the stricken PLO, lacking a logistic and territorial base, will return to its earlier terrorism…. In this way, the PLO will lose part of the political legitimacy that it has gained … undercutting the danger that elements will develop among the Palestinians that might become a legitimate negotiating partner for future political accommodations.”
As another example, take Israel’s Operation Cast Lead from December 27, 2008 to January 18, 2009. Prior to Israel’s assault on the besieged and defenseless population of the Gaza Strip, Israel had entered into a cease-fire agreement with the governing authority there, Hamas. Contrary to popular myth, it was Israel, not Hamas, who ended the cease-fire.
The pretext for Operation Cast Lead is obligatorily described in Western media accounts as being the “thousands” of rockets that Hamas had been firing into Israel prior to the offensive, in violation of the cease-fire.
The truth is that from the start of the cease-fire in June until November 4, Hamas fired no rockets, despite numerous provocations from Israel, including stepped-up operations in the West Bank and Israeli soldiers taking pop-shots at Gazans across the border, resulting in several injuries and at least one death.
On November 4, it was again Israel who violated the cease-fire, with airstrikes and a ground invasion of Gaza that resulted in further deaths. Hamas finally responded with rocket fire, and from that point on the cease-fire was effectively over, with daily tit-for-tat attacks from both sides.
Despite Israel’s lack of good faith, Hamas offered to renew the cease-fire from the time it was set to officially expire in December. Israel rejected the offer, preferring instead to inflict violent collective punishment on the people of Gaza.
As the Israeli Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center noted, the truce “brought relative quiet to the western Negev population”, with 329 rocket and mortar attacks, “most of them during the month and a half after November 4”, when Israel had violated and effectively ended the truce. This stands in remarkable contrast to the 2,278 rocket and mortar attacks in the six months prior to the truce. Until November 4, the center also observed, “Hamas was careful to maintain the ceasefire.”
If Israel had desired to continue to mitigate the threat of Palestinian militant rocket attacks, it would have simply not ended the cease-fire, which was very highly effective in reducing the number of such attacks, including eliminating all such attacks by Hamas. It would not have instead resorted to violence, predictably resulting in a greatly escalated threat of retaliatory rocket and mortar attacks from Palestinian militant groups.
Moreover, even if Israel could claim that peaceful means had been exhausted and that a resort military force to act in self-defense to defend its civilian population was necessary, that is demonstrably not what occurred. Instead, Israel deliberately targeted the civilian population of Gaza with systematic and deliberate disproportionate and indiscriminate attacks on residential areas, hospitals, schools, and other locations with protected civilian status under international law.
As the respected international jurist who headed up the United Nations investigation into the assault, Richard Goldstone, has observed, the means by which Israel carried out Operation Cast Lead were not consistent with its stated aims, but was rather more indicative of a deliberate act of collective punishment of the civilian population.

Myth #8 – God gave the land to the Jews, so the Arabs are the occupiers.

No amount of discussion of the facts on the ground will ever convince many Jews and Christians that Israel could ever do wrong, because they view its actions as having the hand of God behind it, and that its policies are in fact the will of God. They believe that God gave the land of Palestine, including the West Bank and Gaza Strip, to the Jewish people, and therefore Israel has a “right” to take it by force from the Palestinians, who, in this view, are the wrongful occupiers of the land.
But one may simply turn to the pages of their own holy books to demonstrate the fallaciousness of this or similar beliefs. Christian Zionists are fond of quoting passages from the Bible such as the following to support their Zionist beliefs:
“And Yahweh said to Abram, after Lot had separated from him: ‘Lift your eyes now and look from the place where you are – northward, southward, eastward, and westward; for all the land which you see I give to you and your descendants forever. And I will make your descendants as the dust of the earth; so that if a man could number the dust of the earth, then your descendants could also be numbered. Arise, walk in the land through its length and its width, for I give it to you.” (Genesis 13:14-17)
“Then Yahweh appeared to him and said: ‘Do not go down to Egypt; live in the land of which I shall tell you. Dwell in the land, and I will be with you and bless you; for to you and your descendants I give all these lands, and I will perform the oath which I swore to Abraham your father.” (Genesis 26: 1-3)
“And behold, Yahweh stood above it and said: ‘I am Yahweh, God of Abraham your father, and the God of Isaac; the land on which you lie I will give to you and your descendants.” (Genesis 28:13)
Yet Christian Zionists conveniently disregard other passages providing further context for understanding this covenant, such as the following:
“You shall therefore keep all My statutes and all My judgments, and perform them, that the land where I am bringing you to dwell may not vomit you out.” (Leviticus 20:22)
“But if you do not obey Me, and do not observe all these commandments … but break My covenant … I will bring the land to desolation, and your enemies who dwell in it shall be astonished at it. I will scatter you among the nations and draw out a sword after you; your land shall be desolate and your cities waste … You shall perish among the nations, and the land of your enemies shall eat you up.” (Leviticus 26: 14, 15, 32-33, 28)
“Therefore Yahweh was very angry with Israel, and removed them from His sight; there was none left but the tribe of Judah alone…. So Israel was carried away from their own land to Assyria, as it is to this day.” (2 Kings 17:18, 23)
“And I said, after [Israel] had done all these things, ‘Return to Me.’ But she did not return. And her treacherous sister Judah saw it. Then I saw that for all the causes for which backsliding Israel had committed adultery, I had put her away and given her a certificate of divorce; yet her treacherous sister Judah did not fear, but went and played the harlot also.” (Jeremiah 3: 7-8)
Yes, in the Bible, Yahweh, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Israel, told the Hebrews that the land could be theirs – if they would obey his commandments. Yet, as the Bible tells the story, the Hebrews were rebellious against Yahweh in all their generations.
What Jewish and Christian Zionists omit from their Biblical arguments in favor of continued Israel occupation is that Yahweh also told the Hebrews, including the tribe of Judah (from whom the “Jews” are descended), that he would remove them from the land if they broke the covenant by rebelling against his commandments, which is precisely what occurs in the Bible.
Thus, the theological argument for Zionism is not only bunk from a secular point of view, but is also a wholesale fabrication from a scriptural perspective, representing a continued rebelliousness against Yahweh and his Torah, and the teachings of Yeshua the Messiah (Jesus the Christ) in the New Testament.

Myth #9 – Palestinians reject the two-state solution because they want to destroy Israel.

In an enormous concession to Israel, Palestinians have long accepted the two-state solution. The elected representatives of the Palestinian people in Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had since the 70s recognized the state of Israel and accepted the two-state solution to the conflict. Despite this, Western media continued through the 90s to report that the PLO rejected this solution and instead wanted to wipe Israel off the map.
The pattern has been repeated since Hamas was voted into power in the 2006 Palestinian elections. Although Hamas has for years accepted the reality of the state of Israel and demonstrated a willingness to accept a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip alongside Israel, it is virtually obligatory for Western mainstream media, even today, to report that Hamas rejects the two-state solution, that it instead seeks “to destroy Israel”.
In fact, in early 2004, shortly before he was assassinated by Israel, Hamas founder Sheik Ahmed Yassin said that Hamas could accept a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Hamas has since repeatedly reiterated its willingness to accept a two-state solution.
In early 2005, Hamas issued a document stating its goal of seeking a Palestinian state alongside Israel and recognizing the 1967 borders.
The exiled head of the political bureau of Hamas, Khalid Mish’al, wrote in the London Guardian in January 2006 that Hamas was “ready to make a just peace”.  He wrote that “We shall never recognize the right of any power to rob us of our land and deny us our national rights…. But if you are willing to accept the principle of a long-term truce, we are prepared to negotiate the terms.”
During the campaigning for the 2006 elections, the top Hamas official in Gaza, Mahmoud al-Zahar said that Hamas was ready to “accept to establish our independent state on the area occupied [in] ’67”, a tacit recognition of the state of Israel.
The elected prime minister from Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, said in February 2006 that Hamas accepted “the establishment of a Palestinian state” within the “1967 borders”.
In April 2008, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter met with Hamas officials and afterward stated that Hamas “would accept a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders” and would “accept the right of Israel to live as a neighbor next door in peace”. It was Hamas’ “ultimate goal to see Israel living in their allocated borders, the 1967 borders, and a contiguous, vital Palestinian state alongside.”
That same month Hamas leader Meshal said, “We have offered a truce if Israel withdraws to the 1967 borders, a truce of 10 years as a proof of recognition.”
In 2009, Meshal said that Hamas “has accepted a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders”.
Hamas’ shift in policy away from total rejection of the existence of the state of Israel towards acceptance of the international consensus on a two-state solution to the conflict is in no small part a reflection of the will of the Palestinian public. A public opinion survey from April of last year, for instance, found that three out of four Palestinians were willing to accept a two-state solution.

Myth #10 – The U.S. is an honest broker and has sought to bring about peace in the Middle East.

Rhetoric aside, the U.S. supports Israel’s policies, including its illegal occupation and other violations of international humanitarian law. It supports Israel’s criminal policies financially, militarily, and diplomatically.
The Obama administration, for example, stated publically that it was opposed to Israel’s settlement policy and ostensibly “pressured” Israel to freeze colonization activities. Yet very early on, the administration announced that it would not cut back financial or military aid to Israel, even if it defied international law and continued settlement construction. That message was perfectly well understood by the Netanyahu government in Israel, which continued its colonization policies.
To cite another straightforward example, both the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate passed resolutions openly declaring support for Israel’s Operation Cast Lead, despite a constant stream of reports evidencing Israeli war crimes.
On the day the U.S. Senate passed its resolution “reaffirming the United States’ strong support for Israel in its battle with Hamas” (January 8, 2009), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) issued a statement demanding that Israel allow it to assist victims of the conflict because the Israeli military had blocked access to wounded Palestinians – a war crime under international law.
That same day, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon issued a statement condemning Israel for firing on a U.N. aid convoy delivering humanitarian supplies to Gaza and for the killing of two U.N. staff members – both further war crimes.
On the day that the House passed its own version of the resolution, the U.N. announced that it had had to stop humanitarian work in Gaza because of numerous incidents in which its staff, convoys, and installations, including clinics and schools, had come under Israeli attack.
U.S. financial support for Israel surpasses $3 billion annually. When Israel waged a war to punish the defenseless civilian population of Gaza, its pilots flew U.S.-made F-16 fighter-bombers and Apache helicopter gunships, dropping U.S.-made bombs, including the use of white phosphorus munitions in violation of international law.
U.S. diplomatic support for Israeli crimes includes its use of the veto power in the U.N. Security Council. When Israel was waging a devastating war against the civilian population and infrastructure of Lebanon in the summer of 2006, the U.S. vetoed a cease-fire resolution.
As Israel was waging Operation Cast Lead, the U.S. delayed the passage of a resolution calling for an end to the violence, and then abstained rather than criticize Israel once it finally allowed the resolution to be put to a vote.
When the U.N. Human Rights Council officially adopted the findings and recommendations of its investigation into war crimes during Operation Cast Lead, headed up by Richard Goldstone, the U.S. responded by announcing its intention to block any effort to have the Security Council similarly adopt its conclusions and recommendations. The U.S. Congress passed a resolution rejecting the Goldstone report because it found that Israel had committed war crimes.
Through its virtually unconditional support for Israel, the U.S. has effectively blocked any steps to implement the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The so-called “peace process” has for many decades consisted of U.S. and Israeli rejection Palestinian self-determination and blocking of any viable Palestinian state.

By:  Jeremy R. Hammond